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Summary
As is generally recognized, the functioning of China’s legal system is seriously impaired 
by widespread corruption in courts. This thesis intends to identify the systemic causes of 
corruption in China’s courts by firstly investigating how corruption is carried out in 
China’s courts. Apart from the introducing and concluding chapters, this thesis is 
consisted of six main chapters. 
Chapter 2 develops a typology of various corrupt activities in China’s courts and 
examines its general patterns. It finds that corruption takes place in the central court 
divisions, at almost all levels of the judicial system, regardless of its hierarchical level 
and geographic location. Such conduct may involve all types of judges, regardless of their 
competence or salary. Chapter 2 recognizes, however, that the prevalence and the features 
of the corrupt conduct are more closely associated with the nature, range as well as value 
of the decision-making power held by the offender. Chapter 2 also shows that among all 
corrupt activities corruption conducted in the form of exchange, namely bribery or 
favoritism, is the most prevalent and resilient type. This particular type of corruption is 
then selected as the focus of the rest of the thesis.  
Chapter 3 sets out with an introduction of the main analytical framework, which 
overarches the thesis. This analytical framework treats corruption as a four-phase 
contracting process, namely 1) the phase of initiation of the exchange; 2) the phase of 
negotiation of the exchange; 3) the phase of contractual performance; and 4) the phase of 
enforcement of the contract in case of non-performance. This framework is employed in 
an endeavor to analyze the empirical data collected from various sources and to 
demonstrate in details the features and patterns of corrupt conduct in each of the four 
phases so as to identify more accurately which factor(s) has(have) facilitated corruption 
in China’s courts. In doing that, Chapter 3 identifies two phases that are most critical to 
the completion of corrupt exchange. The first phase is the initiation phase, in which 
corrupt intent is communicated between potential exchange parties. The second phase is 
the phase of contractual performance, especially that of the bribed. These two phases are 
further examined respectively in Chapter 4 and in Chapter 5 and 6, demonstrating how 
these two phases are completed by corruption participants in China’s courts and what 
factors have facilitated the process and contributed to its “success”. 
Chapter 4 recognizes that the initiation phase is facilitated by the omnipresent and 
omnipotent “guanxi-practice” in China. It finds that guanxi-practices are effective in 
reducing the legal, moral and cognitive barriers that prohibit the communication of 
corrupt intent and hence have greatly improved the efficiency of the otherwise 
prohibitively costly initiation phase of corrupt exchange. Chapter 5 and 6 identifies the 
decision-making mechanism in China’s courts as a structural factor, which has facilitated 
the delivery of corrupt services in courts and resulted in the proliferation of corrupt 
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opportunities. Chapter 6 also discusses the dynamics of corrupt activities in China’s 
courts, which appear as a multi-player, multi-dimensional and dynamic phenomenon 
instead of being one-on-one, one-dimensional and static. 
Chapter 7 investigates corruption in anti-corruption institutions and finds that the same 
factors that have facilitated corruption in China’s courts have also contributed to the 
spreading of corruption in anti-corruption institutions, which are governed by similar 
rules of decision-making and which are exposed to the same social institution of 
guanxi-practices. Following the above-mentioned findings, some policy 
recommendations are provided in the concluding chapter suggesting the directions of 
future reforms.  
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